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Introduction 
This article evaluates the political theory that heightened fresh water scarcity is a root cause 
of war; a concern that has risen in prominence with climate change. Whilst water insecurity is 
indeed likely to become more acute, the article, nevertheless, argues that there is no 
compelling evidence for ‘water wars’ and even hope to imagine that this might prove a spur 
for more cooperation rather than conflict. 
 The Water Wars Thesis 
With the coming to a close of the Cold War that had so dominated international relations a 
new strand of enquiry emerged from the mid-1980s suggesting future insecurity might be 
more about resources than ideology. For example, prior to becoming UN Secretary General, 
Egyptian politician Boutros-Ghali declared in 1985 that; the next war in the Middle East will 
be fought over water, not politics’. (BBC 2003) Academically, the Canadian Homer-Dixon 
has been at the forefront of this area of study, leading teams of researchers since the 1990s in 
exploring the possibility of causal links between environmentally-induced resource depletion 
and military conflict. His extensive research led him to claim that links can be shown to exist. 
‘Environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the 
world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming 
decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity’. (Homer-Dixon 1994: 6)  
 
Homer-Dixon’s research focused on developing countries since his belief was that such states 
were less likely to adapt to the social effects of environmental degradation than developed 
countries and thus are more prone to this form of conflict. Hence, Homer-Dixon does not 
postulate that environmental scarcity leads directly to conflict but that it can be a root cause 
of social unrest that can spill over into violent unrest. In line with explanations of famine, 
environmental scarcity (of, for example, water) occurs through the interplay of three factors; 
the supply of resources, the demand for resources, and changes in the distribution of 
resources. Two phenomena, emerging from changes in the three factors, are identified by 
Homer-Dixon as the key link between environmental scarcity and social unrest; ‘resource 
capture’ and ‘ecological marginalization’. Resource capture occurs when elites within a state 
respond to falls in supply or rises in demand by appropriating more resources for themselves 
and leave the poorer sections of society to bear the brunt of scarcity. Ecological 
marginalization is said to occur when population growth and / or changes in access to 
resources for certain sections of the populus produce migrations which cause the over-
exploitation of resources in certain areas (Homer-Dixon 1994: 10-11).Amongst case studies, 
undertaken by colleagues of Homer-Dixon to illustrate his thesis, was the Senegal River 
conflict of 1980, seen as an illustration of how ‘resource capture’ can lead to conflict. An 
ethnic conflict between the politically dominant Arabic Mauers and black Mauritanians 
followed the expropriation of black land by the Mauers. This land grab was in response to 
scarcity resulting from a rise in land prices resulting from a damming project. Ethnic 
Senegalese numbered amongst the black Mauritanian population and Maures numbered 
among the population of neighbouring Senegal, causing the ethnic unrest to become 
internationalised (Homer-Dixon & Percival 1996).  
 
Many others have come to link scarcity with war and a subsequent strand of the resource war 
literature has emerged specifically in relation to climate change. Dupont and Pearman, for 
example, posit that a warming world has increased the likelihood of conflict in several ways:, 
including as a consequence of land being rendered uninhabitable due either to water scarcity 
or inundation (Dupont & Pearman 2006). In an empirical study by Colombia University, 
similar in style to the Homer-Dixon research, it was found that countries effected by the El 
Niňo – Southern Oscillation extreme weather phenomenon between 1950 and 2005 were 
twice as likely to experience major civil or international conflict (i.e. those with at least 25 
fatalities) as those not.  Amongst cases highlighted in the study was civil war in Sudan- most 
notably in Darfur- which had flared up in parallel with the onset of extreme droughts. The 
study concluded that; ‘when crops fail people may take up a gun simply to make a living’ 
(Hsiang, Meng & Cane 2011).  
This resource wars thesis certainly convinced the US Clinton government of the early 1990s 
that environmental degradation represented a potential source of military insecurity. Homer-
Dixon is known to have been invited to brief Vice President Al Gore and the State 
Department on several occasions (Floyd 2010: 75-76).  In 1993 a new government position in 
the Defense Department was created, the Deputy Under Secretary for Environmental 
Security, and the Environmental Task Force was set up as part of Washington’s intelligence 
network. The introduction to the 1994 National Security Strategy Document, an annual 
government statement of foreign policy aims, states that ‘...an emerging class of transnational 
environmental issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently 
present new challenges to U.S. strategy..’ (USA 1994: 1). Other countries have followed suit 
in stating that environmental change is a foreign policy concerns, such as the UK where, in 
2008, climate change was referred to in an inaugural National Security Strategy and, a year 
later, a new role of climate and energy security envoy was created.  
 
Water Wars Scepticism 
Despite its influence on the thinking of some governments and academia, the approach of 
framing environmental scarcity as a military security matter has not been without its critics. 
The empirical evidence linking environmental degradation and political conflict is, by 
Homer-Dixon’s own admission, not straightforward, prompting scepticism as to whether 
other variables are the real causes of conflicts in situations where environmental scarcity can 
be demonstrated. Smith, for example, points out that the Senegal River conflict was more 
about ethnic and class conflict than access to river water (Smith 1994).  Levy criticizes the 
Homer-Dixon-led research on the grounds that the fact that only LDCs are chosen as case 
studies is a tacit admission that general poverty, rather than environmental change, is the root 
cause of the conflicts analyzed (Levy 1995: 45). The central assumption that changes in the 
balance between resources and people creates political problems is viewed as flawed logic by 
resource war sceptics. It is easy to link droughts in Sudan to the Darfur Crisis but such events 
are unfortunate facts of life in the Sahel and the responsibility for the bloodshed lies squarely 
with the Janjaweed insurgents and the Sudanese government for giving a green light to their 
murderous campaigns (Brown & McLennan 2009: 297). History also can provide plenty of 
evidence of increased water stress not prompting conflicts, such as the devastating dustbowls 
that struck the US Great Plains in the 1930s  (Brown & McLennan 2009: 296). Similarly, 
Australia has been as much affected by el Niňo as much as Sudan but has not been struck by 
civil war for obvious economic and political reasons. The cited cases suggest a correlation 
between conflict and underdevelopment and a lack of democracy more than with 
environmental scarcity. 
 
The notion that water wars are an emerging phenomenon is also questionable. Gleick points 
out that such conflicts actually go back 5,000 years and lists a number of them including an 
ancient ‘dambuster’ raid by Alexander the Great of Greece against Persia between 355 and 
323 BC. (Gleick 1994) Access to resources has always been a source of conflict since ‘who 
gets what’ is the fundament of political contention but there is no obvious correlation 
between scarcity and war to be mapped out over time. Not only are ‘water wars’ nothing new, 
they barely register in an analysis of modern military history. Despite a spate of publications 
warning of the likelihood of conflicts fought to secure freshwater supplies, particularly in the 
arid and volatile Middle East (Starr 1991, Bullock & Adel 1993), no war of this kind was 
fought in the twentieth century and it has played little part in Arab-Israeli hostilities 
(Libiszewski 1995). Consequently a bourgeoning ‘anti resource war’ literature has emerged 
providing empirical evidence that cooperative responses to increased resource scarcity are 
more common than conflictual ones (Salehyan 2008, Reuveny 2008, Nordas & Gleditsch 
2007). As Barnett concludes; ‘on the basis of existing environment and conflict research there 
is simply insufficient evidence and too much uncertainty to make anything other than highly 
speculative claims about the effect of climate change on violent conflict’ (Barnett 2003:10).  
A three year empirical project carried out by a team at Oregon State University provides solid 
grounds for suggesting that international quarrels over water resources are invariably dealt 
with cooperatively rather than inducing conflict. The study found that there had been 1831 
international political interactions over water in the previous 50 years of which none had 
produced war and only 507 instigated a dispute (two thirds of these disputes were purely 
verbal and only 37 had any armed dimension). In contrast 1228 of those international water 
interactions produced cooperative responses including 157 treaties (Wolf 2007).  There is no 
evidence that fighting over depleting resources is in any way a distinguishing feature of the 
contemporary world. Indeed, scarcity may even be a source of greater peace by giving a spur 
to more cautious and cooperative diplomacy. 
Dinar observes that; ‘In general, the history of hydropolitics is one of negotiation and 
cooperation rather than militarized conflicts’ (Dinar 2011: 185) and offers supporting 
evidence from a region marked both by aridity, poverty, ethnic tension and limited 
democracy. The Helmand River Agreement of 1973 occurred when Iran gave trade 
concessions to the Afghan government in order to guarantee water supplies. Relations 
between Syria and Turkey improved rather than deteriorated after a diplomatic dispute over 
the effects of the latter’s South Eastern Anatolian damming project on the Euphrates in the 
late 1980s, culminating in a 1987 bilateral accord guaranteeing downstream Syria a specified 
share of water. Syrian concerns on this issue were channelled through the European Union 
and the World Bank instead of ratcheting up the stakes vis a vis Ankara and this 
multilateralism worked in their favour given the Turk’s western orientation. A reassured 
Syria then struck a similar deal of their own with their downstream riparian Iraq over the 
Euphrates in 1989 (Dinar 2011: 184).  
Conclusions 
Securing access to water is becoming more critical with parts of the world experiencing 
dwindling supplies of this most precious of commodities. It does not follow from this, 
though, that the people most affected will be forced to fight over it. Responsible management 
and cooperation is a more rational and fruitful political response to scarcity than conflict. 
Democratization and interdependence leaves room for optimism that we are not entering an 
era of water wars. Democracies are forced to confront resource allocation questions as a 
matter of course and, increasingly, act on environmental degradation even if no obvious 
human side-effect is apparent. In addition, democracies (and some non-democracies) long 
ago came to the conclusion that resources are more easily secured through trade and common 
management than conflict. There is a compelling pessimistic logic to the water wars thesis 
but it does not stand up to much academic scrutiny. Equally, though, it could be dangerous to 
entirely dismiss the possibility that the thesis could come to have some relevance in the future 
on the basis that it is not yet supported by evidence. The allocation of resources is the 
fundament of all politics and desperation or bloody-mindedness sometimes manifest 
themselves in political violence. It would be foolish to entirely dismiss the possibility that 
increased water scarcity due to global warming could yet see the resource wars scenario 
become a reality but there is scope for optimism that common resources can be managed 
amicably by most states in the present state system. 
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